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Abstract 
Conflicts since the end of the Cold War have seen military and civilian assets deployed side by side as 
part of an overall UN mandated solution. In order to visually present the integrated nature of humanitarian 
supply chains ‘Structured Analysis and Design Technique’ (SADT) has been used. SADT was chosen as 
it provides a robust structured method to model hierarchical systems and for this research it provides an 
opportunity to define and analyse the coordination and co-operation in terms of the humanitarian supply 
chain process, humanitarian supply chain activities and the actors involved. This research demonstrates 
that the visualisation facility that SADT provides not only helps in understanding the interrelationships 
between the actors and stakeholders involved in a humanitarian supply chain but also to some extent 
explains how a more effective co-ordination of humanitarian operations by military and civilian 
organisations involved in a complex emergency can be achieved.   
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Introduction 
No one…has a monopoly on humanitarian work. The military should not just assist relief 
and aid organisations by protecting convoys but should become directly involved in 
providing aid.  (Ziegler and Handley, 2004:9) 
 
Humanitarian aid involves a growing and complex plethora of actors and agencies from the civil, business 
and military sectors (Oloruntoba & Gray 2006). As identified by Thomas and Kopczak, (2005) 
humanitarian logistics, as well as business logistics, encompasses a range of activities including 
preparedness, planning, procurement, transport, warehousing, tracking and tracing and customs 
clearance (see Figure 1). This presupposes a sophisticated coordination of activities to carry out the 
primary mission of humanitarian aid – delivery of product and/or service to the end user, whose immediate 
and longer term survival may depend upon efficient completion of logistics and supply chain operational 
activity up to and including the crucial ‘ last fifty metres’.  
 
Figure 
1: Fritz Institute Humanitarian Supply Chain (Source: Thomas, 2004) 
 
The current empirical literature for humanitarian logistics emphasises response from post-event 
evaluation, rather than from detailed pre-planning. Response may be a successful tactic in a controllable 
emergency scenario requiring limited flexibility and offering achievable solutions. In a humanitarian crisis 
where complexity reigns an alternative approach is called for. It requires the components of integration, 
collaboration and intensity of focus for systems, people and aligned organisations from a multiplicity of 
backgrounds grounded in instinctive flexibility and adaptability to rapid change coming from the 
confidence engendered by incisive training and development. REWORK 
 
It might be argued that there is no common ground between business, military and humanitarian logistics 
and supply chain management because of sector-specific conflicting tensions in mission objectives (i.e. 
customer-context -objectives). The underpinning hypothesis of this paper is that there is no fundamental 
difference, principles and practices from each are adaptable and interchangeable with the fundamental 
nature of logistics, which is shifting product or service in response to customer need. The triad of 
business, military and humanitarian logistics superficially display compositions and responses as 
independent supply chain activities, with a number of distinct and independent actors with differing 
logistics management styles (Grant 2004). Except for context and objectives, there is a subtle connection, 
the commonality of logistics and the supply chain as a phenomenon with singular principles and practices 
(Harrison & van Hoek 2005:6-13; Chopra & Meindl 2007:9-16; Grant et al 2006:3-29).This singularity 
offers opportunity for the incorporation of best practice training in collaborative techniques and concepts 
into humanitarian logistics supply chain management (HLSCM) development. 
 
Recently a wide variety of government, military, academic and business literature has ranged across 
humanitarian logistics and supply chain management pre and post operations activities. No specific 
research has been undertaken to examine if there are common cause and effect principles across the 
business, military and humanitarian triad which may in turn offer to assist in developing an improved 
common global training and operational application template for HLSCM personnel. Outside the world of 
business, logisticians in many other fields face the challenge of successfully managing the transition 
between steady state and surge situations (Tatham & Kovács, 2007). This is particularly true for 
humanitarian logisticians preparing and executing their organisations’ response to a rapid onset disaster 
where the price of failure can be counted in lives rather than lost profits (Tatham & Kovács, 2007).   
 
 
Methodology 
This paper is intended to contribute to the humanitarian logistics and supply chain operations literature, 
and also to encourage further debate around themes introduced in the strategic evaluation of military, 
non-military and composite emergency relief logistics (Pettit & Beresford 2005), the comparison of 
humanitarian and commercial supply chains Beamon 2004), and the co-ordination of humanitarian 
operations (Rietjens et al 2007). The literature review, although of necessity selective, enabled 
identification of a clear gap between practice (functionality) and empiric evaluation and preparedness 
(strategy) for HLSCM which can activate the whole scenario of risk-related failures (Table 1; figure 2). 
Solutions proposed in the literature reviewed centre upon variants adapted from lean and agile conceptual 
approaches to logistics and supply chain management, which have been applied in business and military 
logistics operations and continue to be so applied, with some successes, but also some failures. Lean and 
agile concepts have a common logistics systemic specificity requiring collaboration throughout and 
between the supply chain tiers and actors at all levels and positions of responsibility, together with 
innovative adaptable response to unpredictable demand variability. Where collaboration is not developed 
sufficiently to offer a robust and responsive logistics system, product or service delivery failure is 
inevitable, this is a given to any commercial or military logistics professional. Evidence of the propensity to 
HLSCM failure from inattention to supply chain relationships has been supported by the numerous well 
publicised humanitarian logistics operational failures of recent years, in which lack of coordination (i.e. 
collaboration) between actors has played a major role. In part this appears to be attributable to a silo-
functional approach to HLSCM by aid organisations and their personnel, an approach which has been, or 
is being, rapidly abandoned in the business and military logistics sectors. 
 
The author’s research is centred on a case study approach. The case study is a research strategy, which 
focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings (Eisenhart, 1989). Yin (1994), 
proposed a technical definition as follows: A case study is an empirical enquiry that: • Investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context; • Where the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clear; and • In which multiple sources of evidence are used. 
The primary motivation for the research was the need to examine the effect of integrated logistics system 
operating in the region, and their impact on responsive disaster logistics management. The main construct 
behind the research was that of “disaster logistics responsiveness”. One of the main hypotheses derived 
from the construct was that, what are the determinants of a responsive logistics system during a disaster?  
 
The choice of research design and methodology are closely linked. The research design process will 
involve the outlining of strategies for performing the research and the use of the most appropriate type of 
research methods. Analysis and conclusions will be dealt with in the following sections. In this research, 
the author’s main research strategy is to use the “triangulation” technique within his case study.  
 
Triangulation of research methods lends greater empirical support to the theory in question where both 
qualitative and quantitative methods are used appropriately (Gubba and Lincoln, 1994: 105-117). In this 
case study, the author used three types of triangulation techniques. The first was “investigator” 
triangulation (i.e. by employing multiple observers for the same phenomenon) as the author collected data 
from users of the NGOs; victims, policy makers, and local and international volunteers. This data 
triangulation has been done in six affected provinces (Phuket, Phang Nga, Krabi, Ranong, Trang, and 
Satun) of southern Thailand. Since Thailand was the main focus of the research, the emphasis on Thai 
policy makers, transport/logistics service providers, workers/volunteers and victims was a prerequisite for 
the successful completion of the study. Policy makers, transport/logistics service providers, 
workers/volunteers and victims in the neighbouring countries were not considered part of the research.  
 
The second triangulation technique was “theory” triangulation (i.e. by approaching empirical materials 
from various perspectives, theoretical framework and interpretations). The third triangulation technique 
was “data” triangulation. The author collected data from government sources, newspapers, magazine 
articles, websites, interview data from the NGOs who participated in relief work, policy makers, 
experienced people who were either victims or volunteers, etc. This data triangulation has been done in 
Phuket, Phang Nga, Krabi, Ranong, Trang, and Satun (see Table 1).  
 
 
The author combined different theories in order to try to obtain a fuller picture of the study. The methods of 
data collection and interpretation used in this case study were: 1. Questionnaire (structured interviews); 2. 
Unstructured interviews; 3. Procedures used in handling the disaster. In the research, more than 120 
respondents were interviewed between January and December 2005. Some respondents were 
interviewed individually and some were interviewed in focus groups of 4 or 5 persons depending of their 
availability. A confidence index was used to appraise ‘risk analysis’ in this study, which was derived from 
the field of political science, especially political instability methodology. Qualitative predictive research in 
political instability focuses upon intuition, judgment and Delphi forecasting (Andriole and Hopple, 1983: 
75-97).). Intuitive qualitative forecasting is central to a systematic analysis.  
 
The explorative nature of this project and the complexity of the research problems as well as our research 
objects demand a holistic perspective and suggests empirical case studies, which are especially well 
suited for obtaining necessary depth of exploring and developing understanding for under-researched 
areas (Ellram 1996, Yin 2003). Based on systematic combining (Dubois & Gadde 2002), our case set 
studies develop through interplay between the real world and a model world. Our preliminary theoretical 
framework is confronted with reality in order to identify new questions and needs for other concepts from 
the model world. The work in the model world then gives another of questions to reality, leading to new 
theoretical questions. Providing a starting point both for research problems and a common knowledge 
base for all project participants, our cases have been chosen in a systematic way in order to cover 
variability of the dimensions of interest. We will undertake three single case studies (Yin 2003) that vary 
with regards to degree of centralization, type of disasters and coordination, e.g. in terms of civilian/military 
cooperation, and use of coordination mechanisms: IFRC regional logistics concept for handling sudden-
onset natural disasters, United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) and Military Peacekeeping 
Operations (PKO). Each of these is detailed below.  
 
With regards to data collection, each case study will be based on a multitude of sources, including 
technical artefacts (i.e. physical structures, product catalogues and ICT systems), systematic interviews, 
documents and archival material, possibly cross sectional data and time series data. In order to ensure 
reliability, a case study protocol including semi-structured interview guides will be developed. A case study 
database for inclusion of notes from each interview, detailed write-up of each case and other 
documentation, will be developed. Multiple data sources will be used to ensure construct validity, as will a 
pre-structured case outline for data analysis (Ellram 1996, Yin 2003).  
 
Modelling 
The Asian tsunami of 2004 placed humanitarian aid provision under greater stresses than ever before with 
the sheer scale of the disaster leaving more than 220,000 dead. Aid distribution had to be co-ordinated on 
an unprecedented scale amongst a number of Governments and a wide range of NGOs, UN bodies, 
ICRC and Military players (Marlowe, 2005). During that disaster the function of logistics in effective relief 
became familiar to the public. (Perry, 2007) As a consequence of the Tsunami in 2004 and in prior 
logistics research (van Wassenhove 2006), preparedness and responsiveness were shown to be 
connected.  
 
Logistics problems arising from disasters, e.g., drought and earthquakes, in spite of their critical importance 
have, especially in the area of relief distribution, elicited only a limited amount of related research (Sheu, 
2007).  Whereas the literature traditionally has focused on improving efficiency and reducing costs, i.e. on 
the leanness of supply chains (Lee 2004), the current trend within commercial logistics is towards more 
innovative and responsive, i.e. agile supply chains that operate in highly dynamic environments (e.g. 
Towill and Christopher 2002). A major question is whether traditional models, describing topics as supply 
chain modelling and optimisation (Lee et al. 2004, Svensson 2003), performance measurement (Bagchi et 
al. 2005, Beamon 1999), supply chain processes (Croxton et al. 2001, Lambert et al. 1998), portfolio 
models (Fisher 1997), and collaboration and integration within and across company boundaries (Barratt 
2004, Fawcett and Magnan 2002, Min et al. 2005), work for temporary and non-commercial systems 
typical for humanitarian logistics. Research on ‘event’ or ‘project’ logistics such as humanitarian logistics is 
attracting attention, but is still scant. Concerning coordination and integration the question of 
centralized versus decentralized structures and decision making has been of particular interest in 
prior research, for example regarding sourcing and procurement (e.g. Stock and Lambert 2001, 
Gutierrez et al. 2003). REWORK Coordination and linkages within and between temporary solutions and 
more permanent networks have been discussed in research on logistics in the construction sector in 
particular (see e.g. Dubois and Gadde 2002). 
 
In view of the complexity and difficulty in solving the emergency logistics distribution problem within a single 
model, there is now a tendency of decomposing the original problem into related sub-problems, which are 
then solved within the same decision scheme. An example is the two-level hierarchical decomposition 
approach given in Barbarosoglu et al. (2002) in respect of the problem of helicopter mission planning during a 
disaster relief operation.  Another example is a study by Ozdarmar et al. (2004) which interestingly combines 
the vehicle routing problem with the relief distribution process, regarding vehicles as commodities and splitting 
the complex emergency logistics distribution problem into two multi-commodity network sub-problems, and 
then solving them by means of Lagrangean relaxation (Daskin, M.S.,1995). Different optimization methods 
and systems dynamics models have also been examined, for example; Hybrid fuzzy clustering 
optimization (e.g. Sheu, 2007a), combinatorial optimization in terms of Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP) 
(e.g. Yi and Özdamar, 2007), real-time decision-making systems (ARES) (Brown and Vassiliou, 1993) and 
simulation by Rockwell Software’s Arena v. 80 (e.g. Beamon and Kotleba, 2006). 
 
Humanitarian relief supply chains can be seen as a systems exercise, involving the integration and co-
ordination of widely scattered groups of specialists (Stevenson, 1994). There are many different types of 
logistic programmes and activities that have to be planned and implemented around the specific 
catastrophe that has occurred, but forward planning can be initiated through the use of an accepted 
template for disaster planning (Carter, 1991).  
 
Although many articles have been written from a systems perspective, Structured Analysis and Design 
Technique (SADT) has not been included in humanitarian logistics. From an examination of the literature 
no articles were found where SADT had been used in modelling particularly aimed for humanitarian 
logistics. The main aim of this paper is to create a model that describes the actor interrelationships in a 
relief supply chain using SADT.  
 
REWORK 
The first created model presents the interrelationships of actors during the immediate response 
phase in terms of main flows: information, material and financial flows. The second modelling 
focuses on the material flow and was performed by using XXXX is a very useful tool that can be 
used to simulate discrete dynamic systems and consists of flows, stocks and variables that may 
vary over time. (Kirkwood, 2002) The created systems model illustrates the actors involved and 
their interrelationships or dependencies, which are modelled as discrete functions. 
 
Coordination in Humanitarian Supply Chains 
Central to any relief operation is the establishment and management of an emergency supply chain which 
is often fragile and volatile. The provision of humanitarian aid and the complex logistics systems which 
enable that aid to be delivered are more intricate than simply providing disaster relief, for example 
securing humanitarian aid and protecting the supply chain are important (Byman et al, 2000). Provision of 
humanitarian aid generally, although not exclusively, takes place in locations where sophisticated logistics 
techniques are difficult to implement (e.g. major natural disaster or military conflict) and which, therefore 
require some form of co-ordination between NGOs or between military and NGOs but where there is little 
agreement on the status of the relationships between them (Pettit and Beresford, 2006). Responses to 
both natural and man made crises are generally mutli-faceted and involve governments, NGO’s UN 
agencies, military bodies and private sector organisations. 
 
In order to be effective, a supply chain in a humanitarian aid operation should be ‘owned’, that is, 
responsibility for it should be taken by one of the players in the scenario (Moore and Antill, 2000c). Such a 
concept would be in line with commercial practice in, and academic theory in supply chain management. 
Difficulties that arise in the ownership of the supply chain stem from the complexities and difficulties 
inherent in such operations, such as relationship issues, that impair the smooth operation of the cycle. 
The aims and objectives of individual agencies are not always conducive to an integrated and co-
ordinated effort. Objectives that have become highly politicised at the strategic level can impair the 
benefits that can be gained from a concerted and co-operative effort among the various players at the 
operational level. Logistics activities have, until recently, been undertaken in a fragmented and sub-
optimised manner and based upon outdated logistics philosophies.  
 
It is possible to identify a generic model of a supply chain that applies in many of the humanitarian aid 
scenarios. Such a supply chain is usually designed to allow a one-way flow of goods and equipment into 
the theatre of operations to the places where it is needed the most (Hoff, 1999). The ‘actors’ in such 
humanitarian aid scenarios all have differing management styles and administrative structures and whilst 
the supply chain appears straightforward, the complexities in the relationships that occur, together with 
incompatible structures and procedures, may conspire against the establishment of effective supply chain 
strategies.  
 
It has also been found that there is a general concern about the way donors distribute their aid, the 
reactive nature of funding, the unwillingness to fund managerial overheads, the threat to an organisation’s 
freedom of action and the increased pressure for accountability (Molinaro, 2000; Thornton, 2001; Barton, 
2000). This is exacerbated by difficulties within the area of UN / NGO co-ordination which are well 
documented (Molinaro, 2000; de Mello, 2001; Moore and Antill, 2000c; Tomlinson, 2000; Hawley, 2000), 
with issues such as co-ordination verses control, competition, publicity, conflicts of interest and funding 
predominant. There have been however, instances of successful co-ordination through logistics and the 
supply chain. For example, recent operations in Ethiopia have had NGOs and UN agencies using World 
Food Programme (WFP) aircraft to move goods and equipment around. Nevertheless, agencies are often 
reluctant to be co-ordinated but there is potential for UNHCR to track and co-ordinate the shipment of 
goods (Molinaro, 2000). NGOs constitute the main interface between the relief system and the 
beneficiaries and are almost at the end of the supply chain. The position they hold as the implementers of 
aid relief can conflict with their role as advocates for such relief (Molinaro, 2000). 
 
There is much debate over the role of the military within the humanitarian context. Within this 
environment, the military do not seem to participate in any systematic overarching coordinated 
humanitarian plan and are forced to dabble in the provision of humanitarian assistance in an ad hoc 
manner. There are guidelines, such as the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in 
Disaster Relief – Oslo Guidelines (United Nations, 1994), which set out occasions when the military 
should engage in humanitarian activities. However, these guidelines “are in fact rarely observed” (Gill et 
al, 2006:41). The provision of humanitarian assistance by the military continues to generate passionate 
debate, between the military and non military actors (Barry and Jefferys, 2002 and Eriksson 2000), in 
which there is seldom any meeting of minds. 
 
It appears that the civil-military exchange, or partnership, holds great promise for easing human suffering 
and restoring stability in ineffective states: the military brings an unmatched ability to provide security, 
logistical support, and rapid planning, while civilian organizations often offer financial resources, a more 
complete understanding of the local situation, and expertise in providing relief and beginning the long-term 
process of state-building. However, as recent experience has repeatedly demonstrated, however, inter-
organizational cooperation is far from assured - conflict or an absence of coordination has been more 
common (George, 2005). Much of the writing on civil-military interaction in peace operations notes this 
lack of progress (Weiss 1999; Pirnie 1998).  
 
 
 
Supply chain professionals in the commercial sector face many of the same issues of trade-offs in 
performance as a professional working in a disaster relief operation. In business and in disaster relief 
supply chains, speed is of the essence. Even more striking in parallel are military supply chains, which 
often face similarly short deployment periods and challenging working environments. Because of these 
similarities, it is important to understand the underlying principles of commercial and military performance 
measurement systems when developing a system for disaster relief operations. 
 
Military and Humanitarian Supply Chains 
Humanitarian supply chains tend to be unstable, prone to political and military influence, and inefficient 
due to lack of joint planning and inter-organizational collaboration. They face inadequate logistics 
infrastructure, along with shifting origins and/or destinations of relief supplies without warning. 
Furthermore, they have greater issues of safety, involve a great number of stakeholders with various 
mandates and agendas, and always face the unknown. Donors often request their funds be spent on 
direct materials and food, and even at a particular disaster location, rather than on crucial but indirect 
services such as information systems, supply chain management systems, staff training and/or disaster 
preparedness (Kovács and Spens, 2007; Long and Wood, 1995; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Pettit and 
Beresford, 2005; Van Wassenhove, 2006).  
 
According to Fritz Institute researchers, few humanitarian relief agencies prioritize the development of 
logistics and supply chain management. Rather, environmental factors, such as the unpredictability of 
interruptions and uncertain funding, result in high workforce turnover, fragmented technology, and a lack 
of knowledge management. Thus, relief operations are less efficient and effective than they could be, and 
service to beneficiaries is delayed or reduced (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005). Humanitarian assistance 
supply chains must be flexible and able to respond quickly to unpredictable events. They must also be 
efficient, and able to operate within limited budgets. In such supply chains, more effective SCM (i.e. 
improved customer service) can be the difference between life and death; and greater efficiency means 
serving more people in dire need. While “time is money” to the business logistician, time is life to the 
humanitarian. Thus, there are tremendous opportunities to serve more people in need at lower cost 
through SCM best practices.  
 
Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) proposed that a typical humanitarian supply chain could follow the sequence 
in Figure 2. Unlike most business supply chains, the humanitarian aid supply chain is often unstable. 
Commercial Supply Chain 
Humanitarian Supply Chain 
Stockholders
Suppliers Organisation Customers
Material 
Information 
Financial 
Donors
Organisation Beneficiaries Suppliers 
Military Supply Chain 
Organisation
Government
Suppliers Recipients
Sometimes, the supply chain breaks down at the receiving end, but it may also be unstable at its origin for 
two main reasons: politicised donations by governments and the competitive nature of fund-raising from 
private donors (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 2; A typical humanitarian supply chain. Source Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006 p.116 
 
Commercial supply chains focus on the final customer as the source of income for the entire chain. 
However, in humanitarian supply chains the end user (the recipient, the beneficiary or consumer of aid) 
seldom enters into a commercial transaction and has little control over supplies (Oloruntoba and Gray, 
2006). Instead, Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) note that “customer service” or “marketing” of the 
humanitarian service may need to target the supplier/donor, who has to be convinced that humanitarian 
action is taking place. For example, there may be greater “humanitarian visibility” in providing food or 
medicine before basic logistical equipment such as forklifts, although the latter may be necessary for 
effective delivery of the former (Byman et al., 2000). The nature of most disasters demands an immediate 
response, hence supply chains need to be designed and deployed at once even though the knowledge of 
the situation is very limited (Beamon, 2004; Long and Wood, 1995; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2004; 
Kovács & Spens, 2007). This flexibility and agility is where the military supply chain can excel. The main 
problem areas of the immediate response phase lie in coordinating supply, the unpredictability of demand 
and the last mile problem of transporting necessary items to disaster victims (Beamon, 2004; Long and 
Wood, 1995; Ozdamar et al, 2004; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2004; Kovács & Spens, 2007).  
 
As Pettit and Beresford (2005) acknowledged, military organisations must be able to operate in both 
conflict and disaster situations and have to adapt to conditions prevailing at any given moment. 
Consequently, their stance will vary depending on the situation on the ground. This in turn will have an 
impact on the logistics response. One of the identifiable trends is the increasing need for agility 
(adaptability) of military logistical support, with less emphasis on buffer stock and more on manoeuvrability 
(Pettit and Beresford, 2005).  
 
The rationale for moving to a ‘pull’ rather than ‘push’ conceptual approach is that historically HLSCM 
planning and managing has, by the nature of the operational context influenced a reactive ‘push’ mode in 
operational planning and application. ‘Push’ approach implies a low grade collaborative logistics network, 
dominated by an outputs mentality, hence longer reaction times/efficiency and system response 
degradation. 
 
The inherent requirements to alleviate system degradation are grounded in accurate information, demand 
forecasting and smoothing of supply chain distortions, ‘customer’ focused, and with a high level of 
collaborative network efficiency linked to a growing dependency upon ICT. Application of these ‘pull’ type 
requirements do influence HLSCM systems towards becoming ‘lean’ and particularly ‘agile’ compliant, in 
the sense of determining and identifying the key processes for efficient system and network management 
and responsiveness within the humanitarian emergency logistics planning sector. However the current 
post-operational analyses demonstrate that that compliance will not offer anything other than a 
conceptually anodyne solution to what are deeply rooted tendencies to HLSCM structural and system 
failure time after time. The primary cause appears to be a mono-focal emphasis by each tier in the 
logistics network, when an intense collaborative commitment is vital. SIMPLIFY 
 
No longer do organisations strive to provide services and commodities based on their supply, they seek to 
tailor made these to their perceived demand; no longer do organisations keep inventory, they seek to hold 
information of customer requirements; they have shifted from functions to processes, from transactions to 
relationships (Mangan and Christopher XXXX) they do not have the luxury of having a supply chain which 
is lethargic and unresponsive. To do their job effectively they need to be agile, responsive and resilient.  
 
Whether a private sector organisation, an NGO, a Military force or a UN agency, the efficient use of supply 
chain principles provide not only competitive advantage but improvements in humanitarian response. 
Emergencies, man made or natural, will continue to occur on a regular basis (Thomas and Kopczak, 
2005) and logisticians have no control over them though they do have control regarding the quality and 
efficiency of the humanitarian response. In the humanitarian sector, logistics is seen as a means to an 
end. Though some have recognised its importance in providing cost effective aid (Thomas and Kopczak, 
2005) in reality, logistics continues to be a back room activity since is consistently viewed as : ‘the things 
that happen’ between supply and demand. Still, many months after the Indian Ocean tsunami highlighted 
shortcomings in humanitarian logistics, only a handful of aid agencies have prioritized the creation of high-
performing logistics and supply chain operations.  
 
Military forces are seen as a pool of prepared and disciplined source of assistance while the international 
aid community gears itself for action (Hoff, 1999). However, the involvement of the military in such 
operations is not without challenges. A balance must be found between supporting the civilian aid 
agencies to utilise the available military resources, and recognising that military manpower is trained to 
fight and engage in combat operations. There is quite a wide cultural difference between the civilian aid 
worker and the soldier (Hoff, 1999; Whitman, 2001). 
 
From this it is possible to develop areas of ‘mismatch’ when seeking to integrate the various players in a 
holistic manner. This is known as an ‘integrating mismatch’ and creates areas of weakness within the 
system of operation. This can be viewed as an obstacle to the co-ordination of the relief supply chain. 
“There is insufficient direction at the strategic level and little co-operation in terms of training and exercise” 
(Skeats, 1998). At the core of the problem lies the lack of a strategic multi-agency response as each 
organisation has its own strategic headquarters to activate the aid process. The initial focus for 
implementing a co-ordinated multi-agency response could be a combined base logistics centre. Solutions 
to logistic issues demand long-term relationships based on trust and mutual understanding enhanced by 
joint training and exercises. There is also room for the expansion of education, which could cover a wide 
range of topics including culture, law, the characteristics and organisation of NGOs and UN Agencies and 
the processes of in-theatre operational logistics (Heaslip, 2007). 
. 
Notwithstanding these challenges, there are considerable potential benefits of using the armed forces to 
provide, or assist in the provision of, logistic support to humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations. 
The armed forces can bring considerable expertise and professionalism in undertaking logistically 
challenging roles. They can bring a task focus that is inculcated in their modus operandi, which is rarely 
matched by civilian aid agencies. The essential and expensive logistic equipment is often readily available 
for the military; indeed it provides their raison d’etre. Above all there is within the armed forces a ready 
pool of experienced logistics personnel who can act swiftly and effectively when tasked.  
 
 
Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT) Methodology 
The objective of using SADT is for a complete understanding of the components and their present 
activities in the port cluster system. Traditionally, PERT/CPM charts are used to manage organisations 
and work distribution. In the case of functional chart techniques, Flow Charts, HIPO and I-P-O Charts 
could be used for modelling the sequential processing and physical attributes of a system (Fitzgerald and 
Fitzgerald, 1987).  However, this study focuses particularly on activities in the humanitarian supply chain 
and the complexity of this requires the use of a better visualisation technique. 
 
Marca and McGowan (1987) divide the range of systems from complex (e.g., the planetary bodies in a 
solar system) to medium complexity (e.g., the space shuttle) to extremely complex (e.g., molecular 
interactions in living organisms).  The SADT methodology was developed specifically to help people 
describe and understand constructed systems that fall into the spectrum of ‘medium’ complexity. SADT is 
now one of the most widely used system engineering methods (Marca and McGowan, 1987). SADT is a 
complete methodology for developing system descriptions, centred on the concepts of system modelling. 
 
The SADT graphic language organizes the natural language in a particular and unique way. It is because 
of this that SADT can describe complex systems in detail.  From the SADT perspective, a model focuses 
on system activities.  Historically, those SADT models that focus on system activities are called “activity 
models,” and those that focus on system data are called “data models.”  Activity models present system 
activities in a successively detailed manner, and they define the relationship among those activities 
through the entities of the system. The complete SADT methodology also includes the construction of 
multiple models to help in describing a complex system. 
With SADT, model building starts with a simple “box and arrow” graphics (Figure 3) showing the function 
as a box and the interfaces to and from the function as arrows entering or leaving the box.  With reference 
to the relationships or activities in a port cluster within a diagram, the input and output arrows stand for 
activities, data, and material through, into or from an industry or a firm and the control arrow usually shows 
a control or data, such as an order. The mechanism arrow relates to the facility or equipment used for an 
industry activity.  
 
Figure 3 Function Box and Interface Arrows Source: http://www.idef.com 
 
The graphical language of the SADT methodology can be considered to be the most important feature, 
since it produces a modelling method.  This involves the structured decomposition shown in Figure 4, i.e., 
the orderly breaking down and addition of extra detail to a complex system reduced to its constituent 
parts. Because this method of analysis is top-down, hierarchical and structured, it focuses attention on the 
important issues, bringing the correct objectives to the foreground as opposed to irrelevant ones which 
need to be kept in the background. The effect of this in the modelling of a port cluster system becomes 
obvious since, all the parameters involved in any activity within the model can be accounted for.  
Simultaneously, the relationship between activities can be identified. 
 
Aguilar-Saven (2004), in a review and categorisation of over 15 different business process modelling 
techniques, includes an assessment of SADT. SADT, while limited as a ‘passive’ technique in that it does 
not allow the user to interact with, and hence change, the models developed, is particularly useful for 
learning purposes. That is, SADT allows an understanding of what actually goes on in a system, where 
such knowledge was previously lacking. The hierarchical nature of SADT facilitates the rapid development 
of business process models. Furthermore, by its very logic of linking functions in the usual left to right 
manner, the sequencing of activities is identified and hence the process is visualised (Aguilar-Saven, 
2004).  
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Figure 4 Hierarchy and Structured decomposition of SADT 
Source: Modified from http://www.idef.com by authors 
 
 
Proposed Framework for Integrated Supply Chain 
Humanitarian operations by military organisations in peace support missions are, in view of the great 
variety of needs and stakeholders in a complex emergency, considered as operations with considerable 
uncertainty (Rietjens et al, 2007). The armed forces (i.e. land, naval and air forces) of contributing nations 
in peace support missions are unique by virtue of the fact that the UN or some other international 
organization (e.g. NATO, WEU) has authorized them to implement the will of the international community 
(Rietjens et al, 2007). Challenges in respect of co-ordination and integration will need to be met and 
overcome by the various actors on the stage in order to ensure that the holistic view of supply chain 
management can prevail in order to improve performance in respect of logistics in humanitarian, disaster 
relief and complex emergency situations (Moore and Antill, 2002). The input of the model is the onset of a 
complex emergency. In Ireland, a triple lock mechanism is required before military personnel can be 
deployed on peace support operations to assist in complex emergencies; initially, the government decides 
on a case-by-case basis whether, when and how to commit Defence Forces personnel to such operations, 
this is followed by Dail (parliament) approval and then UN authorisation. This mechanism provides a legal 
basis for deployment and actions. Military contingents of different nations are deployed to the host nation 
of the complex emergency under different apparatus. Humanitarian organisations attempt to provide 
assistance (e.g., humanitarian aid, protection of minorities, refugees and displaced persons, medical care 
and reconstruction) often parallel to the deployment of military forces, based on their own charter and 
mission. Having arrived in the host nation, all actors operate in the same operational environment.  
 
To make the model operational, five main phases are identified; Planning, Formation, Assessment, Co-
ordination and Evaluation & Feedback. Within the planning phase three steps are identified; the decision 
to cooperate or not is made by each of the actors (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995). If an actor concludes that 
cooperation is promising, the second step consists of the selection of an appropriate partner (Das and 
Teng, 1997) and the third step is to design the partnership (Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001) which would 
include organisational structure, preparedness measures and training. A lack of co-ordination often leads 
to confusion at the last mile (Murray, 2005), collaborative agreements could be developed (Kaatrud et al, 
2003) with the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC).Recently, many “traditional” transportation 
companies such as DHL or TNT logistics have entered the scene of disaster relief operations, establishing 
partnerships with the United Nations (Kovács and Spens, 2007). This should result in a detailed 
implementation plan describing the rights and duties of each partner.  
 
  
 
The formation phase includes appeals management, pre-purchasing agreements which according to 
Murray (2005), many relief organizations have in situ with suppliers of drugs, tents, sheeting or blankets. 
Stock could be pre-positioned (Thomas, 2003). Bottlenecks are identified through the use of information 
technology, as argued by Long (1997), information systems are the single most important factor in 
determining the success or failure of a disaster relief operation. During the assessment phase needs 
assessment (including medical), environmental factors, infrastructure and requirements for secure, safe 
environment are considered. Because of geographical dispersion, insufficient or inaccurate 
communication between the field and the head offices of humanitarian organizations, and between 
different organizations co-ordination may be inadequate (Mileti, 1999, Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006). 
Assessing demand after a disaster includes a consideration of the cultural peculiarities of the disaster 
region (Beamon, 2004; Kovács and Spens, 2007).  
 
Co-ordination is central to a successful humanitarian supply chain. Logistics co-ordination between NGOs 
has improved in recent humanitarian operations (Van Wassenhove and Samii, 2003) with shared 
equipment, assets or resources such as aircraft, trucks, food stores, forklifts etc., and with some agencies 
or even individuals designated as having the best local knowledge and contacts (Oloruntoba and Gray, 
2006). Aid agencies receive many unsolicited and sometimes even unwanted donations (Kovács and 
Spens, 2007). Unsolicited supplies in fact clog airports and warehouses (Cassidy, 2003; Murray, 2005; 
Kovács and Spens, 2007) and create redundancies (Sowinski, 2003). Within the co-ordination phase 
there is a need to have open communications in coordinating with the actors and suppliers involved in the 
complex emergency. Since military forces should not be involved in a crisis for a long term (NATO, 2003), 
the partnership has to be terminated after completing the agreed plan. If both partners want to continue 
the relationship, a new plan must be developed. As Whitman (2000) poses the question, “What happens if 
the military leaves?” within the co-ordination phase of the model the transfer of tasks and responsibilities 
are considered. Whether planned or unplanned, to prevent the military from a long-term involvement in the 
crisis (e.g., long-term dependence on military resources by the local population, government, or 
humanitarian organisations), tasks and responsibilities have to be transferred (NATO, 2003).  The final 
step of the model is to evaluate the partnership. This results in the final output of the model, the 
performance of the partnership for each of the participating actors. Having transferred tasks and 
responsibilities, it is very important to evaluate the partnership (Das and Teng, 1997). The main reasons 
are to determine the performance of the partnership and to facilitate the justification of finances to donor 
organisations, the communication between organisations, the process of lessons learned, and the 
accountability of the activities (Rubin, 1995). The evaluation of the partnership is the last step of the 
integrated model.  
